Competition and Quality in Regulated Markets with Sluggish Demand

Kurt Brekke (), Roberto Cellini, Luigi Siciliani and Odd Rune Straume

No 2922, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We investigate the effect of competition on quality in regulated markets (e.g., health care, higher education, public utilities), using a Hotelling framework, in the presence of sluggish demand. We take a differential-game approach, and derive the open-loop solution (providers choose the optimal quality investment plan based on demand at the initial period) and the feedback closed-loop solution (providers observe demand in each period and choose quality in response to current demand). If production costs are strictly convex, the steady state quality is higher under the open-loop solution than under the feedback solution. In both solutions, quality and demand move in opposite directions over time on the equilibrium path to the steady state. While fiercer competition (lower transportation costs or less sluggish demand) leads to higher quality in both solutions, the quality response to increased competition is weaker when players use feedback strategies.

Keywords: regulated markets; competition; quality; differential games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H42 I18 I21 L13 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Competition and quality in regulated markets with sluggish demand (2008)
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