Education and Social Mobility

Helmuth Cremer, Philippe De Donder and Pierre Pestieau

No 2951, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper shows that the design of education policy involves a potential conflict between welfare and social mobility. We consider a setting in which social mobility is maximized under the least elitist public education system, whereas welfare maximization calls for the most elitist system. We show that when private education is available, the degree of elitism that maximizes social mobility increases, while the welfare-maximizing degree of elitism decreases. The ranking between the welfare- and mobility-maximizing degree of elitism may even be reversed. Utilitarian welfare is always higher when private supplementary education is available, but social mobility may be reduced.

Keywords: elitism; egalitarianism; private education (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H52 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Education and social mobility (2010)
Working Paper: Education and social mobility (2010)
Working Paper: Education and social mobility (2010)
Working Paper: Education and social mobility (2010)
Working Paper: Education and social mobility (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2951

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