Efficient Education Policy - A Second-Order Elasticity Rule

Wolfram Richter

No 2969, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Assuming a two-period model with endogenous choices of labor, education, and saving, efficient education policy is characterized for a Ramsey-like scenario in which the government is constrained to use linear instruments. It is shown that education should be effectively subsidized if, and only if, the elasticity of the earnings function is increasing in education. The strength of second-best subsidization increases in the elasticity of the elasticity of the earnings function. This second-order elasticity rule extends the well-known Ramsey-Boiteux inverse elasticity rule.

Keywords: endogenous choice of education; second-best efficient taxation; linear instruments; finite periods; Ramsey's Rule; inverse elasticity rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 I28 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Efficient Education Policy - A Second-Order Elasticity Rule (2011)
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