A New Approach to Solving Production-Appropriation Games with Many Heterogeneous Players

Richard Cornes, Roger Hartley and Yuji Tamura

No 3060, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We set out a model of production and appropriation involving many players, who differ with respect to both resource endowments and productivities. We write down the model in a novel way that permits our analysis to avoid the proliferation of dimensions associated with the best response function approach as the number of heterogeneous players increases. We establish existence of a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, and carry out some comparative static exercises.

Keywords: conflict; noncooperative games; aggregative games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Two-aggregate games: Demonstration using a production-appropriation model (2017)
Working Paper: A New Approach to Solving Production-Appropriation Games with Many Heterogeneous Players (2010)
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