The Old-Boy Network and the Quality of Entrepreneurs
Mehmet Bac and
No 3071, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
We study a model of network formation and start-up financing with endogenous entrepreneurial type distribution. A hub firm admits members to its network based on signals about entrepreneurs’ types. Network membership is observable, which allows lenders to offer different interest rates to network and stand-alone entrepreneurs. We show that a network outcome can display a smaller number of high-type entrepreneurs even though the network is neither nepotistic nor informationally disadvantaged. While a welfare-improving network can emerge as a technically stable or unstable equilibrium, one that decreases welfare is always formed by a technically unstable equilibrium. However, the adverse welfare effects of a network and its corresponding type configuration may persist because ex-post high type entrepreneurs prefer to stay high type whereas those who wish to become high-type may need some time to react.
Keywords: entrepreneur; network; start-up financing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D85 L26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: The Old‐Boy Network and the Quality of Entrepreneurs (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3071
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().