Who do you Blame in Local Finance? An Analysis of Municipal Financing in Italy

Massimo Bordignon () and Santino Piazza

No 3100, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: A 1999 reform allowed Italian Mayors to partially substitute a more accountable source of tax revenue (the property tax) with a less transparent one (a surcharge on the personal income tax). Theoretical analysis suggests this should give incompetent Mayors a less costly way to hide themselves, so allowing them to be more easily re-elected. An empirical analysis on Piedmont municipalities confirms these hypotheses.

Keywords: partial decentralization; fiscal federalism; transparency; political behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 H71 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Who do you blame in local finance? An analysis of municipal financing in Italy (2017)
Working Paper: Who do you blame in local finance? An analysis of municipal financing in Italy (2015)
Working Paper: Who do you blame in local finance? An analysis of municipal financing in Italy (2015)
Working Paper: Who do you blame in local finance? An analysis of municipal financing in Italy (2010)
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