Who Should Pay for Certification?

Konrad O. Stahl and Roland Strausz

No 3365, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer - the seller - follows from a nontrivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer-induced certification acts as an inspection device, seller-induced certification as a signalling device. Seller-induced certification maximizes the certifier’s profit and social welfare. This suggests the general principle that certification is, and should be induced by the better informed party. The results are reflected in a case study from the automotive industry, but apply also to other markets - in particular the financial market.

Keywords: asymmetric information; certification; information acquisition; inspection; lemons; middlemen; signaling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 D82 L14 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Who Should Pay for Certification? (2011)
Working Paper: Who should pay for certification? (2011)
Working Paper: Who Should Pay for Certification? (2010)
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