Finite-Population "Mass-Action" and Evolutionary Stability

Axel Bernergard and Karl Wärneryd

No 3378, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Nash proposed an interpretation of mixed strategies as the average pure-strategy play of a population of players randomly matched to play a normal-form game. If populations are finite, some equilibria of the underlying game have no such corresponding “mass-action” equilibrium. We show that for mixed strategy equilibria of 2 × 2 games, the requirement of such a correspondence is equivalent to neutral evolutionary stability.

Keywords: mass action; finite population games; evolutionary stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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