What Should Fiscal Councils Do?

Lars Calmfors and Simon Wren-Lewis

No 3382, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: The paper analyses theoretically what role fiscal councils could play and surveys empirically the activities of existing councils. Case studies of the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council and the UK Office for Budget Responsibility are done. It is concluded that fiscal councils should be advisory, rather than decision-making, and work as complements, rather than substitutes, to fiscal rules. A key issue is the political fragility of fiscal councils and how their long-run viability should be secured. Three ways of guaranteeing their independence are suggested: (1) reputation-building; (2)formal national rules; and (3) international monitoring.

Keywords: deficit bias; fiscal rules; fiscal councils (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (107)

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Related works:
Journal Article: What should fiscal councils do? (2011)
Working Paper: What should fiscal councils do? (2011)
Working Paper: What Should Fiscal Councils Do? (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3382

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