Precommitted Government Spending and Partisan Politics

William Watkins and Henning Bohn

No 3462, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper analyzes government commitments to ongoing spending programs that require future outlays. Spending commitments are important for understanding partisan politics because they constrain future governments. In a model with one government good, a “stubborn liberal” policy maker can use precommitted spending to prevent a later conservative government from imposing decisive spending cuts. In a model where parties differ about spending priorities, reelection uncertainty creates a permanent bias towards higher government spending and higher taxes.

Keywords: government spending; partisan politics; political economy; precommitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3462

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