Property Rights, Optimal Public Enforcement, and Growth

Andreas Irmen and Johanna Kuehnel

No 3668, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We study the link between public enforcement of property rights, innovation investments, and economic growth in an endogenous growth framework with an expanding set of product varieties. We find that a government may assure positive equilibrium growth through public employment in the enforcement of property rights, if the economic environment is sufficiently favorable to growth and/or public enforcement is sufficiently effective. However, in terms of welfare an equilibrium path without property rights protection and growth might be preferable. In this case the enforcement of property rights involves too much reallocation of labor from production and research towards the public sector.

Keywords: technological change; economic development; property rights; public employment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 H11 O10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp3668.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Property rights, optimal public enforcement, and growth (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3668

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().