Domestic Abuse: Instrumental Violence and Economics Incentives

Dan Anderberg and Helmut Rainer

No 3673, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: A large fraction of domestically abused women report that their partners interfere with their participation in education and employment. As of yet, mainstream economics has not dealt in any systematic way with this phenomenon and its implications for welfare policy. This paper puts forward a theoretical framework that rationalizes why men may use violence “instrumentally” to prevent their partners from entering employment or from increasing hours of work. The model predicts a non-monotonic relationship between the gender wage gap and domestic violence. We explore the implication of this result in the context of various welfare policies. There are unlikely to be any magic bullets or one-size-fit-all solutions when it comes to reducing the incidence of domestic violence. Instead, specific measures and incentives may have to be targeted at different types of households.

Keywords: instrumental partner-violence; non-cooperative family decision-making; welfare policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D19 J12 J22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3673

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