EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Voting as a Signaling Device

R. Emre Aytimur (), Aristotelis Boukouras and Robert Schwager

No 3700, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: In this paper, citizens vote in order to influence the election outcome and in order to signal their unobserved characteristics to others. The model is one of rational voting and generates the following predictions: (i) The paradox of not voting does not arise, because the benefit of voting does not vanish with population size. (ii) Turnout in elections is positively related to the size of the local community and the importance of social interactions. (iii) Voting may exhibit bandwagon effects and small changes in the electoral incentives may generate large changes in turnout due to signaling effects. (iv) Signaling incentives increase the sensitivity of turnout to voting incentives in communities with low opportunity cost of social interaction, while the opposite is true for communities with high cost of social interaction. Therefore, the model predicts that smaller communities have more volatile turnout than larger communities.

Keywords: electoral incentives; signaling; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D72 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp3700.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Voting as a signaling device (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Voting as a Signaling Device (2012) Downloads
Working Paper: Voting as a Signaling Device (2012) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3700

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().

 
Page updated 2023-02-02
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3700