Competition for Migrants in a Federation: Tax or Transfer Competition?

Marko Köthenbürger
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Marko Koethenbuerger

No 3709, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: The paper provides an equilibrium analysis of how countries compete for migrants. The type of competition (tax or transfer competition) depends on whether the competing countries have similar policy preferences. With symmetric preferences, countries compete in taxes for migrants. With asymmetric preferences, migration competition takes place in income support levels. The results are robust to the degree of mobility and to whether high-income or low-income households are mobile. The results are relevant, e.g., for federal policies that tackle inefficient migration competition and for evaluating whether a country may wish to adopt unilateral ‘migration-purchase’ policies.

Keywords: migration; redistribution; income taxation; government strategy; endogenous type of competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F20 H70 J20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Competition for migrants in a federation: Tax or transfer competition? (2014)
Working Paper: Competition for Migrants in a Federation: Tax or Transfer Competition? (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3709

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