The Interrelationship between Formal and Informal Delcentralization and its Impact on Sub-Central Governance Performance: The Case of Vietnam

Thanh Thuy Vu, Messaoud Zouikri and Bruno Deffains

No 3714, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Formal and informal institutions are often viewed as complements or substitutes in empirical and theoretical works. However, no evidence of complementarities or substitutes is found in our empirical analysis of the interrelation between formal and informal decentralization across 64 provinces of Vietnam. This paper finds that the formally decentralized system of public service supply is accommodating the informal one, but informal decentralization in public order provision tends to compete with the existing ineffective formal system. This implies that the central government needs to reorganize the system of decentralizing the provision of public goods/services and public in order to make informal institutions complementary rather than rival or free-riding on formal ones.

Keywords: formal decentralization; informal decentralization; sub-central governance; accommodating; and competing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 H11 H73 H83 K00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Interrelationship between Formal and Informal Decentralization and Its Impact on Subcentral Governance Performance: the Case of Vietnam (2014)
Working Paper: The Interrelationship between Formal and Informal Decentralization and Its Impact on Sub-Central Governance Performance: the Case of Vietnam (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3714

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