Voting in Small Committees

Paolo Balduzzi, Clara Graziano and Annalisa Luporini ()

No 3732, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: A small committee has to approve/reject a project with uncertain return. Members have different preferences: some are value-maximizers, others are biased towards approval. We focus on the efficient use of scarce information when communication is not guaranteed, and we provide insights on the optimal committee composition. We show that the presence of biased members can improve the voting outcome by simplifying the strategies of unbiased members. Thus, heterogeneous committees perform at least as well as homogeneous committees. In particular, when value-maximizers outnumber biased members by one vote, the optimal equilibrium becomes unique. Finally, allowing members to communicate brings no improvement.

Keywords: voting; small committees; committees composition; communication in committees (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Related works:
Journal Article: Voting in small committees (2014)
Working Paper: Voting in Small Committees (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3732

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