The Influence of Special Interests and Party Activists on Electoral Competition

Nicolas-Guillaume Martineau ()

No 3811, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper studies the effects on electoral competition of political parties relying on monetary donations and volunteer labour for their electioneering activities. It also examines whether a recorded decline in party activism increases special-interest influence on party policy platforms. Parties are shown to choose differentiated platforms in equilibrium when activists are present, despite factors drawing them together. Special-interest influence on platforms increases when a decline in activism stems from a fall in their motivation, following parties relying less upon them. This reduces procedural welfare, and potentially reduces voter welfare on policy outcomes, thus calling for more strict electoral laws.

Keywords: activism; special-interest politics; political participation; collective action; electoral competition; electoral financing laws; welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Working Paper: The Influence of Special Interests and Party Activists on Electoral Competition (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3811

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