Private Protection against Crime when Property Value is Private Information

Florian Baumann () and Tim Friehe

No 3888, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper analyzes private precautions against crime when the value of the property to be protected is private information. Within a framework in which potential criminals can choose between various crime opportunities, we establish that decentralized decision-making by potential victims may lead to suboptimal levels of investment in private protection. Specifically, suboptimal investment can occur when observable precautions communicate information about property value to potential offenders, even when the diversion effect of private safety measures is taken into account.

JEL-codes: D62 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp3888.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Private protection against crime when property value is private information (2013)
Working Paper: Private protection against crime when property value is private information (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3888

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().