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The Citizen-Candidate Model with Imperfect Policy Control

R. Emre Aytimur (), Aristotelis Boukouras and Robert Schwager

No 3900, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We examine the two-candidate equilibria of the citizen-candidate model when the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and an unelected external power. We show that the equilibria of this model differ significantly from the original: the distance between the candidates’ policies, both ideal and implemented, remains strictly above a threshold. Thus, the median voters’ ideal policy may not obtain in contested elections if policy control is imperfect, even when the cost of running as a candidate is arbitrarily small.

Keywords: elections; polarization; strategic delegation; bureaucracy; foreign influence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Citizen-Candidate Model with Imperfect Policy Control (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: The citizen-candidate model with imperfect policy control (2015) Downloads
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