Bounded Rationality and Voting Decisions Exploring a 160-Year Period

David Stadelmann and Benno Torgler

No 3907, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Using a natural voting experiment in Switzerland that encompasses a 160-year period (1848–2009), we investigate whether a higher level of complexity leads to increased reliance on expert knowledge. We find that when more referenda are held on the same day, constituents are more likely to refer to parliamentary recommendations in making their decisions. This finding holds true even when we narrow our focus to referenda with a relatively lower voter turnout on days on which more than one referendum was held. We also show that when constituents face a higher level of complexity, they listen to parliament rather than interest groups.

Keywords: bounded rationality; voting; referenda attention; rules of thumb (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D72 D83 H70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Bounded Rationality and Voting Decisions Exploring a 160-Year Period (2012)
Working Paper: Bounded Rationality and Voting Decisions Exploring a 160-Year Period (2012)
Working Paper: Bounded Rationality and Voting Decisions Exploring a 160-Year Period (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3907

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