Trade Union Membership and Sickness Absence: Evidence from a Sick Pay Reform

Laszlo Goerke and Markus Pannenberg

No 3909, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: In 1996, statutory sick pay was reduced for private sector workers in Germany. Using the empirical observation that trade union members are dismissed less often than non-members, we construct a model to predict how absence behaviour will respond to the sick pay reform. We show that union members may have stronger incentives to be absent and to react to the cut in sick pay. In the empirical investigation, we find a positive relationship between trade union membership and absence due to sickness and observe more pronounced reactions to the cut in sick pay among union members than among non-members. These findings suggest that more flexibility in the use of paid absence due to sickness constitutes a private gain from trade union membership.

Keywords: difference-in-differences; sickness-related absence; Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP); statutory sick pay; trade union membership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I18 J22 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Trade union membership and sickness absence: Evidence from a sick pay reform (2015)
Working Paper: Trade Union Membership and Sickness Absence: Evidence from a Sick Pay Reform (2012)
Working Paper: Trade Union Membership and Sickness Absence: Evidence from a Sick Pay Reform (2012)
Working Paper: Trade Union Membership and Sickness Absence: Evidence from a Sick Pay Reform (2012)
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