Auctions and Corruption

Yvan Lengwiler and Elmar Wolfstetter

No 401, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes that may prevent corruption, and compare them to the fee schedules employed by major auction houses.

Keywords: Auctions; procurement; corruption; collusion; coalitions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Auctions and corruption (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_401

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