The Political Economics of the Arab Spring

Roland Hodler

No 4023, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: The Arab Spring has led to very different outcomes across the Arab world. I present a highly stylized model of the Arab Spring to better understand these differences. In this model, dictators from the ethnic or religious majority group concede power if their country is oil-poor, but can stay in power by bribing the people if their country is oil-rich. Dictators from the minority group often rely on other members of their group to repress protests and to fight the majority group if necessary. These predictions are consistent with observed outcomes in Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and elsewhere.

Keywords: Arab Spring; political transitions; repression; civil conflict; oil; divided societies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: THE POLITICAL ECONOMICS OF THE ARAB SPRING (2018)
Working Paper: The Political Economics of the Arab Spring (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4023

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