A Simple Model of the Commercial Lobbying Industry

Thomas Groll and Christopher J. Ellis

No 4110, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: In this paper we model the commercial lobbying industry (such as the so-called K-Street lobbyists of Washington, D.C.). In contrast to classical special interest groups commercial lobbying firms are not directly motivated by policy outcomes. They exist to make profits by selling intermediaries services between their clients and policymakers. We explain why these firms exist, and their implications for social welfare. We find that in a simple general equilibrium framework the market level of commercial lobbying services is typically socially inefficient, and characterize the nature of the distortions involved.

Keywords: lobbying; influence activities; information acquisition; financial contributions; commercial lobbying firms; political access (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A simple model of the commercial lobbying industry (2014)
Working Paper: A Simple Model of the Commercial Lobbying Industry (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4110

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