Dynamic Commercial Lobbying

Thomas Groll and Christopher J. Ellis

No 4114, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This study explains the observed repeated personal interactions between lobbyists and policymakers. The analysis uses a dynamic model of commercial lobbying in which citizens may hire lobbyists to present policy proposals on their behalf to policymakers. It is shown that repeated interactions with lobbyists simplify a policymaker’s information problem in the presence of unverifiable information provision and allow a solution to their contracting problem. The welfare implications of these interactions depend on whether the policymakers’ information or contracting problem predominates. Further, the policymaker’s information problem and financial contributions may actually improve social welfare in comparison to the full information outcome.

Keywords: dynamic lobbying; influence activities; information acquisition; financial contributions; commercial lobbying; political access; moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp4114.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4114

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().