Federal Monetary Policy

Carsten Hefeker

No 422, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: What is the optimal institutional structure for an independent central bank? The paper shows when it will be optimal for a country to have a central bank to be organized according to federal, purely national or a combination of both aspects. The analysis is then extended to a supranational monetary union and it is shown which organizational structure of a common central bank is optimal for participating countries and when they are willing to join. The implications for an enlargement of a monetary union are derived as well.

Keywords: Monetary union; federalism; monetary policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Journal Article: Federal Monetary Policy (2003)
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