On the Political Economy of Social Security and Public Education

Panu Poutvaara

No 424, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper proposes and analyzes a model of a “European economy” with three overlapping generations, redistributive social security, and public universities without tuition. Individuals differ ex ante. The effect of wage tax rate on occupational choice and the voting equilibrium of wage tax rate and educational investments are analyzed both under full certainty and with income risks facing the educated and the uneducated.

Keywords: Education; social security; redistributive taxation; occupational choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On the political economy of social security and public education (2006)
Working Paper: On the political economy of social security and public education (2006)
Working Paper: On the Political Economy of Social Security and Public Education (2004)
Working Paper: On the Political Economy of Social Security and Public Education (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_424

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