Strategic Interaction in the Market for Physician Services: The Treadmill Effect in a Fixed Budget System

Franz Benstetter and Achim Wambach

No 427, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We examine the strategic interaction in the market for physician services when the total budget for reimbursement is fixed. We show that this prospective payment system involves ƒ{ compared to a fee-for-service remuneration system ƒ{ a severe coordination problem, which potentially leads to the "treadmill effect". For the institutional setting of German primary physician service we provide evidence for decreasing reimbursement per treatment, which is consistent with theoretical predictions. When market entry is possible, a budget can be efficiency enhancing, if in addition a price floor is used.

Keywords: Health economics; supplier-induced demand; remuneration systems; coodination device (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo_wp427.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_427

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().