Geopolitics, Aid and Growth

Axel Dreher, Vera Eichenauer, Kai Gehring and Vera Z. Eichenauer
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Vera Z. Eichenauer

No 4299, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We investigate the effects of short-term political motivations on the effectiveness of foreign aid. Donor countries’ political motives might reduce the effectiveness of conditionality, channel aid to inferior projects or affect the way aid is spent in other ways, reduce the aid bureaucracy’s effort, and might impact the power structure in the recipient country. We investigate whether geopolitical motives matter by testing whether the effect of aid on economic growth is reduced by the share of years a country has served on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in the period the aid has been committed, which provides quasi-random variation in commitments. Our results show that the effect of aid on growth is significantly lower when aid has been granted for political reasons. We derive two conclusions from this. First, short-term political favoritism reduces growth. Second, political interest variables are invalid instruments for aid, raising doubts about a large number of results in the aid effectiveness literature.

Keywords: aid effectiveness; economic growth; politics and aid; United Nations Security Council membership; political instruments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F35 F53 O11 O19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Geopolitics, Aid and Growth (2014)
Working Paper: Geopolitics, Aid and Growth (2014)
Working Paper: Geopolitics, Aid and Growth (2014)
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