Credibility for Sale

Harris Dellas () and Dirk Niepelt

No 4335, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We develop a sovereign debt model with official and private creditors where default risk depends on both the level and the composition of liabilities. Higher exposure to official lenders improves incentives to repay but carries extra costs, such as reduced ex-post flexibility. The model implies that official lending to sovereigns takes place in times of debt distress; carries a favorable rate; and can displace private funding even under pari passu provisions. Moreover, in the presence of long-term debt overhang, the availability of official funds increases the probability of default on existing debt, although default does not trigger exclusion from private credit markets. These findings help shed light on joint default and debt composition choices of the type observed during the recent sovereign debt crisis in Europe.

Keywords: sovereign debt; official lending; default; enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F34 H63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Credibility For Sale (2013)
Working Paper: Credibility For Sale (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4335

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