Taxing Multinationals in the Presence of Internal Capital Markets

Marko Köthenbürger and Michael Stimmelmayr
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Marko Koethenbuerger

No 4353, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: There is ample evidence that internal capital markets incur efficiency costs for multinational enterprises (MNEs). This paper analyzes whether tax avoidance behavior interacts with the costs of running an internal capital market and how policies of competing governments respond to it. We show that the interaction in itself may lead to profit taxes that are too high (low) from a social perspective, provided the costs are attenuated (magnified) by higher profit taxes. We also show that internal efficiency costs might render infrastructure provision inefficiently low. Further, we clarify the implications of the MNE’s decision to set up an internal capital market and the effect of external finance on the behavior of competing governments.

Keywords: fiscal competition; multinational firms; internal efficiency costs; corporate finance; corporate tax avoidance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 F23 H25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Taxing multinationals in the presence of internal capital markets (2016)
Working Paper: Taxing multinationals in the presence of internal capital markets (2014)
Working Paper: Taxing Multinationals in the Presence of Internal Capital Markets (2013)
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