A Theory of Patent Portfolios

Jay Choi and Heiko Gerlach

No 4405, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper develops a theory of patent portfolios in which firms accumulate an enormous amount of related patents in diverse technology fields such that it becomes impractical to develop a new product that with certainty does not inadvertently infringe on other firms’ patent portfolios. We investigate how litigation incentives for the holders of patent portfolios impact the incentives to introduce new products and draw welfare implications. We also consider a patent portfolio acquisition game in which a third party’s patent portfolio is up for sale.

Keywords: patent portfolios; patent litigation; practicing and non-practicing entities; patent troll (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 O30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A Theory of Patent Portfolios (2017)
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