Strategic Choices for Redistribution and the Veil of Ignorance: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Anke Gerber, Andreas Nicklisch and Stefan Voigt

No 4423, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We provide experimental evidence on the emergence of redistributive societies. Individuals first vote on redistribution by feet and then learn their productivity and invest. We vary the individuals’ information about their productivities at the time when they choose a distribution rule and find that there is more redistribution behind a veil of ignorance than under full information. However, the scope of redistribution is less sensitive towards the degree of uncertainty than predicted. For all degrees of uncertainty, we find a coexistence of libertarianism and redistribution as well as incomplete sorting, so that heterogeneous redistribution communities turn out to be sustainable.

Keywords: constitutional choice; experimental economics; redistribution; veil of ignorance; voting by feet (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D02 D63 H24 K00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Strategic choices for redistribution and the veil of ignoranceː theory and experimental evidence (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4423

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