Private Provision of Public Goods and Information Diffusion in Social Groups

Kimberley Scharf

No 4492, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We describe a dynamic model of costly information sharing, where private information affecting collective-value actions is transmitted by social proximity. Individuals make voluntary contributions towards the provision of a pure public good, and information transmission about quality of provision is a necessary condition for collective provision to take place in a stationary equilibrium. We show that, unlike in the case of private goods, better informed individuals face positive incentives to incur a cost to share information with their neighbours; and that these incentives are stronger, and provision of the pure public good greater, the smaller are individuals’ social neighbourhoods.

Keywords: private provision of public goods; information transmission; social learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D60 D70 H10 L30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS AND INFORMATION DIFFUSION IN SOCIAL GROUPS (2014)
Working Paper: Private Provision of Public Goods and Information Diffusion in Social Groups (2011)
Working Paper: Private Provision of Public Goods and Information Diffusion in Social Groups (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4492

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