Equitable Representation in the Councils of the United Nations: Theory and Application

Matthew Gould and Matthew Rablen

No 4519, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We develop a theoretical framework for equity in council voting games (CVGs). In a CVG, a fully representative voting body delegates decision-making to a subset of the members, as describes, e.g., the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Three equity concepts are proposed: ex-ante (procedural) equity, ex-post (outcome) equity and regional equity. The last two concepts are consistent with a new square-root rule on the probability of council membership, but no CVG can meet all three concepts. We apply our framework to evaluate the equitability of the UNSC, and the claims of those who seek to reform it.

Keywords: United Nations Security Council; United Nations; voting power; councils; square-root rule; equity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C71 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Equitable Representation in the Councils of the United Nations: Theory and Application (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4519

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