On the Sensitivity of Collective Action to Uncertainty about Climate Tipping Points

Scott Barrett and Astrid Dannenberg

No 4643, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Previous research shows that collective action to avoid a catastrophic threshold, such as a climate “tipping point,” is unaffected by uncertainty about the impact of crossing the threshold but that collective action collapses if the location of the threshold is uncertain. Theory suggests that behavior should differ dramatically either side of a dividing line for threshold uncertainty. Inside the dividing line, where uncertainty is small, collective action should succeed. Outside the dividing line, where uncertainty is large, collective action should fail. We test this prediction in the experimental lab. Our results strongly support the prediction: behavior is highly sensitive to uncertainty around the dividing line.

Keywords: collective action; prisoners' dilemma; coordination game; threshold uncertainty; negotiations; tipping points; climate change; experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 F51 H41 H87 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (61)

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