The Roommate Problem - Is More Stable Than You Think

Pierre Chiappori, Alfred Galichon and Bernard Salanié

No 4676, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Stable matchings may fail to exist in the roommate matching problem, both when utility is transferable and when it is not. We show that when utility is transferable, the existence of a stable matching is restored when there is an even number of individuals of indistinguishable characteristics and tastes (types). As a consequence, when the number of individuals of any given type is large enough there always exist “quasi-stable” matchings: a stable matching can be restored with minimal policy intervention. Our results build on an analogy with an associated bipartite problem; it follows that the tools crafted in empirical studies of the marriage problem can easily be adapted to the roommate problem.

JEL-codes: C78 J12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Roommate Problem is More Stable than You Think (2012)
Working Paper: The Roommate Problem is More Stable than You Think (2012)
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