Black Sheep or Scapegoats? Implementable Monitoring Policies under Unobservable Levels of Misbehavior

Berno Buechel and Gerd Muehlheusser
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Berno Büchel

No 4698, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: An authority delegates a monitoring task to an agent. It can only observe the number of detected offenders, but neither the monitoring intensity chosen by the agent nor the resulting level of misbehavior. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the implementability of monitoring policies. Typically, several monitoring intensities give rise to the same number of detected offenses, and only the minimum of these can be implemented. In equilibrium, a large fraction of potential offenders cannot be deterred.

Keywords: monitoring; deterrence; unobservable misbehavior; victimless crime; doping; law & economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Black Sheep or Scapegoats? Implementable Monitoring Policies under Unobservable Levels of Misbehavior (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4698

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