Stable and Sustainable Global Tax Coordination with Leviathan Governments

Thomas Eichner and Rüdiger Pethig

No 4909, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Itaya et al. (2014) study the conditions for sustainability and stability of capital tax coordination in a repeated game model with tax-revenue maximizing governments. One of their major results is that the grand tax coalition is never stable and sustainable. The purpose of this note is to prove that there are conditions under which the grand tax coalition is stable and sustainable in Itaya et al.’s model.

Keywords: global tax coordination; repeated game; sustainability; stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H71 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Working Paper: Stable and sustainable global tax coordination with Leviathan governments (2014)
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