Politically Sustainable Probabilistic Minority Targeting

Philippe De Donder and Eugenio Peluso

No 4915, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We show that a transfer targeting a minority of the population is sustained by majority voting, however small the minority targeted, when the probability to receive the transfer is decreasing and concave in income. We apply our framework to the French social housing program and obtain that empirically observed departures from these assumptions are small enough that a majority of French voters should support a positive size of this program. We also provide a sufficient condition on this probability function under which more targeting results in a lower equilibrium size of the transfer system.

Keywords: paradox of redistribution; a program for the poor is a poor program; majority voting; social housing in France (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H53 I38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Related works:
Working Paper: Politically Sustainable Probabilistic Minority Targeting (2014)
Working Paper: Politically Sustainable Probabilistic Minority Targeting (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4915

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