Labor Policies and Capital Mobility in Theory and in EMU

Giuseppe Bertola

No 4919, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: “Race-to-the-bottom” deregulation is to be expected when markets operate across the borders of countries that independently choose and enforce labor policies. Less obviously, in pre-crisis EMU reforms of labor market policies were uneven and related to international imbalances. That pattern is readily explained by this paper’s model of financial integration between differently capital-abundant countries, within which labor policies benefit individuals with wealth/labor income ratios different from country’s aggregate.

Keywords: policy competition; public choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F00 J38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Labor policies and capital mobility in theory and in EMU (2016)
Working Paper: Labor policies and capital mobility in theory and in EMU (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4919

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