Optimal Redistributive Pensions and the Cost of Self-Control

Pier-André Bouchard St-Amant (pabsta@grepa.ca) and Jean-Denis Garon

No 4937, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We examine how the introduction of self-control preferences influences the trade-off between two fundamental components of a public pension system: the contribution rate and its degree of redistribution. The pension regime affects individuals’ welfare by altering how yielding to temptation (i.e. not saving, or saving less) is attractive. We show that proportional taxation increases the cost of self-control, and that this adverse effect is more acute when public pensions become more redistributive.

Keywords: taxation; redistribution; pensions; self-control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 H21 H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal redistributive pensions and the cost of self-control (2015)
Working Paper: Optimal Redistributive Pensions and the Cost of Self-Control (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4937

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