Households, Markets and Public Choice

Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller

No 4947, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We develop a model that combines competitive exchange of private commodities across endogenously formed groups with public good provision and global collective decisions. There is a tension between local and global collective decisions. In particular, we show that group formation and collective decisions on public goods may destabilize each other, even if there exist favorable conditions for matching on the one hand, and for global collective decisions on the other hand. We establish sufficient conditions for the existence of competitive equilibria with endogenous household formation and public choice.

Keywords: household formation; matching; general equilibrium; public goods; public choice; median voter theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D10 D51 D62 D70 H20 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp4947.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Households, markets and public choice (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4947

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().