Inefficient School Choice in a Long-Run Urban Equilibrium

Ulrich Kamecke

No 4969, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We model centralized school matching as a second stage of a simple Tiebout-model and show that the two most discussed mechanisms, the deferred acceptance and the Boston algorithm, both produce inefficient outcomes and that the Boston mechanism is more efficient than deferred acceptance. This advantage vanishes if the participants get to know their priorities before they submit their preferences. Moreover, the mechanism creates artificial social segregation at the cost of the disadvantaged if the school priorities are based on ex ante known (social) differences of the applicants.

Keywords: school choice; deffered acceptance; Boston mechanism; Tiebout-hypothesis; social seggregation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 H42 R23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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