Asymmetric Neutrality Regulation and Innovation at the Edges: Fixed vs. Mobile Networks
Jay Choi (),
Doh-Shin Jeon () and
Byung-Cheol Kim ()
No 4974, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
We study how net neutrality regulations affect a high-bandwidth content provider’s (CP) investment incentives in quality of services (QoS). We find that the effects crucially depend on network capacity levels. With limited capacity, as in mobile networks, prioritized delivery services are complementary to the CP’s investments and can facilitate entry of congestion-sensitive content; however, this creates more congestion for other existing content. By contrast, if capacity is relatively large, as in fixed-line networks, prioritized services reduce QoS investment as they become substitutes, but improves traffic management. These results are qualitatively robust to the extension of the ISP’s endogenous choice of network capacity.
Keywords: net neutrality; asymmetric regulation; quality of service; investment incentives; queuing; congestion; mobile; fixed networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 K20 L10 L50 O30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Asymmetric Neutrality Regulation and Innovation at the Edges: Fixed vs. Mobile Networks (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4974
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