Union Bargaining Power and Product Innovation: Relevance of the Preference Function

Debasmita Basak, Andreas Hoefele and Arijit Mukherjee

No 5007, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We show the effects of the bargaining power of labour unions on product innovation under decentralised and centralised wage bargaining. In this context, we show the implications of preference function, which affects the market size. A higher union bargaining power increases innovation if bargaining is decentralised, the market expansion effect is weak and the cost of innovation is moderate but low. Otherwise, a higher union bargaining power reduces innovation. Hence, whether a higher union bargaining power increases or decreases product innovation depends on the type of wage bargaining, market expansion effect and the cost of innovation.

Keywords: centralised union; decentralised union; product innovation; union utility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 J51 L13 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp5007.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5007

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().