Political Yardstick Competition, Economic Integration, and Constitutional Choice in a Federation

Martin Bodenstein and Heinrich Ursprung

No 501, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper investigates the behavior of rent-seeking politicians in an environment of increasing economic integration. The focus of the paper is on the implications of globalization-induced political yardstick competition for constitutional design with a view to the current discussion in the European Union. In contrast to the established literature, we carefully portray the double-tiered government structure in federal systems. The number of lower-tier governments and the allocation of policy responsibilities to the two levels of government are subject to constitutional choice.

Keywords: Economic Integration; Federalism; Political Economy; Yardstick Competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Political yardstick competition, economic integration, and constitutional choice in a federation (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_501

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