Welfare Effects of Short-Time Compensation

Helge Braun and Björn Brügemann
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Bjoern A. Bruegemann

No 5063, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We study welfare effects of public short-time compensation (STC) in a model in which firms respond to idiosyncratic profitability shocks by adjusting employment and hours per worker. Introducing STC substantially improves welfare by mitigating distortions caused by public unemployment insurance (UI), but only if firms have access to private insurance. Otherwise firms respond to low profitability by combining layoffs with long hours for remaining workers, rather than by taking up STC. Optimal STC is substantially less generous than UI even when firms have access to private insurance, and equally generous STC is worse than not offering STC at all.

Keywords: short-time compensation; unemployment insurance; welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Welfare Effects of Short-Time Compensation (2017)
Working Paper: Welfare Effects of Short-Time Compensation (2014)
Working Paper: Welfare Effects of Short-Time Compensation (2014)
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