Selection in Tournaments: The Case of Chess Players
Laurent Linnemer and
Michael Visser
No 5160, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
Abstract:
We consider a simple tournament model in which individuals auto-select into the contest on the basis of their commonly known strength levels, and privately observed strength-shocks (reflecting temporary deviations from observed levels). The model predicts that the participation rate should increase with the player’s observed strength, and the total awarded prize amount. Furthermore, under certain conditions self-selection implies that participants with high observed strength levels have smaller expected strength-shocks than those with low levels. Consequently, the latter should play better than predicted and the former worse (given their observed strength). These predictions are confronted with data from a large chess tournament held in the USA. This tournament is divided into different sections, with players being able to play in the section to which their current chess rating (observed strength) belongs. As predicted, we find that within each section the participation probability increases with chess rating and prize amounts, and players with a relatively low (resp. high) rating are indeed the ones who have a better (resp. worse) relative performance.
Keywords: chess; prizes; relative performance; selection; sorting; tournament (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Related works:
Working Paper: Selection in Tournaments: The Case of Chess Players (2014) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5160
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