Incentives to Work and Performance in the Public Sector

George Economides, Apostolis Philippopoulos and Petros Varthalitis ()

No 5193, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model with three distinct social groups, capitalists, private workers and public employees. After solving for the status quo equilibrium, which can mimic the advantages of employment in the public sector in most EU countries, the paper looks for policy reforms that can improve work incentives, and hence enhance productive efficiency, in the public sector. We focus on reforms aiming to establish parity between work conditions in the public and the private sector.

Keywords: dynamic general equilibrium models; efficiency; equity; employment; incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5193

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